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Abstract
Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little
consideration for how each side’s preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online
markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it has become necessary to better understand
the interplay between learning and market objectives. We propose a statistical learning model
in which one side of the market does not have a priori knowledge about its preferences for
the other side and is required to learn these from stochastic rewards. Our model extends the
standard multi-armed bandits framework to multiple players, with the added feature that arms
have preferences over players. We study both centralized and decentralized approaches to this
problem and show surprising exploration-exploitation trade-offs compared to the single player
multi-armed bandits setting.
1 Introduction
Research in machine learning has focused on pattern recognition in recent years. Another major
branch of machine learning—decision making under uncertainty—has comparatively received less
attention. Literatures on bandits and reinforcement learning, though active, mainly study problem
settings involving single decisions or decision-makers. In real-world settings, individual decisions
must generally be made in the context of other related decisions. Moreover, real-world decisions
often involve scarcity, with competition among multiple decision-makers. This yields additional
uncertainty and complications, implying there are tradeoffs to be sought. To study such settings we
need to blend economics with learning.
In this paper, we present a formal study of such a blend. We focus on the multi-arm bandit
(MAB) problem, a core machine-learning problem in which there are K actions giving stochastic
rewards, and the learner must discover which action gives maximal expected reward [8, 17, 18, 31].
The bandit problem highlights the fundamental tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. Regret
bounds quantify this tradeoff. We study an economic version of the problem in which there are
multiple agents solving a bandit problem, and there is competition—if two or more agents pick the
same arm, only one of the agents is given a reward.1 We assume that the arms have a preference
ordering over the agents—a key point of departure from the line of work on multi-player bandits
with collisions [9, 10, 19, 30]—and this ordering is unknown a priori to the agents.
∗Equal contribution
1Note that [22] and [4] have used the term “competing bandits” for a different problem formulation where a user
can choose between two different bandit algorithms; this differs from our setting where multiple learners compete over
scarce resources.
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We are motivated by problems involving two-sided markets that link producers and consumers
or workers and employers, where each side sees the other side via a recommendation system, and
where there is scarcity on the supply side (for example, a restaurant has a limited number of seats,
a street has a limited capacity, or a worker can attend to one task at a time). The overall goal
is an economic one—we wish to find a stable matching between producers and consumers. To
study the core mathematical problems that arise in such a setting, we have abstracted away the
recommendation systems on the two sides, modeling them via the preference orderings and the
differing reward functions. Several massive online labor and service markets can be captured by
this abstraction; see the end of this section for an illustration of an application. In the context of
two-sided markets the arms’ preferences can be explict, e.g. when the arms represent entities in the
market with their own utilities for the other side of the market, or implicit, e.g. when the arms
represent resources their “preferences” encode the skill levels of the agents in securing those resources.
To determine the appropriate notions of equilibria in our multi-agent MAB model, we turn to
the literature on stable matching in two-sided markets [13, 14, 28, 16, 27]. Since its introduction
by Gale and Shapley [13], the stable matching problem has had high practical impact, leading to
improved matching systems for high-school admissions and labor markets [25], house allocations
with existing tenants [1], content delivery networks [21], and kidney exchanges [29].
In spite of these advances, standard matching models tend to assume that entities in the market
know their preferences over the other side of the market. Models that allow unknown preferences
usually assume that preferences can be discovered through one or few interactions [5], e.g., one
interview per candidate in the case of medical residents market [25, 28]. These assumptions do not
capture the statistical uncertainty inherent in problems where data informs preferences.
In contrast, our work is motivated by modern matching markets which operate at scale and
require repeated interactions between the two sides of the market, leading to exploration-exploitation
tradeoffs. We consider two-sided markets in which entities on one side of the market do not know
their preferences over the other side, and develop matching and learning algorithms that can provably
attain a stable market outcome in this setting. Our contributions are as follows:
• We introduce a new model for understanding two-sided markets in which one side of the market
does not know its preferences over the other side, but is allowed multiple rounds of interaction.
Our model combines work on multi-armed bandits with work on stable matchings. In particular,
we define two natural notions of regret, based on stable matchings of the market, which quantify
the exploration-exploitation trade-off for each individual agent.
• We extend the Explore-then-Commit (ETC) algorithm for single agent MAB to our multi-agent
setting. We consider two versions of ETC: centralized and decentralized. For both versions we
prove O(log(n)) problem-dependent upper bounds on the regret of each agent.
• In addition to the known limitations of ETC for single agent MAB, in Section 3.2 we discuss other
issues with ETC in the multi-agent setting. To address these issues we introduce a centralized
version of the well-known upper confidence bound (UCB) algorithm. We prove that centralized
UCB achieves O(log(n)) problem-dependent upper bounds on the regret of each agent. Moreover,
we show that centralized UCB is incentive compatible.
Most of the above results can be extended to the case where arms also have uncertain preferences
over agents in a straightforward manner. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the setting where
one side of market initiates the exploration and leave extensions of our results to future work.
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Online labor markets Our model is applicable to matching problems that arise in online labor
markets (e.g., Upwork and Taskrabbit for freelancing, Handy for housecleaning) and online crowd-
sourcing platforms (e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turks). In this case, the employers, each with a stream
of similar tasks to be delegated, can be modeled as the players, and the workers can be modeled as
the arms. For an employer, the mean reward received from each worker when a task is completed
corresponds to how well the task was completed (e.g., did the Turker label the picture correctly?).
This differs for each worker due to differing skill levels, which the employer does not know a priori
and must learn by exploring different workers. A worker has preferences over different types of tasks
(e.g., based on payment or prior familiarity the task) and can only work on one task at a time; hence
they will pick their most preferred task to complete out of all the tasks that are offered to them.
2 Problem setting
We denote the set ofN agents byN = {p1, p2, . . . , pN} and the set ofK arms by K = {a1, a2, . . . , aK}.
We assume N ≤ K. At time step t, each agent pi selects an arm mt(i), where mt ∈ KN is the vector
of all agents’ selections.
When multiple agents select the same arm only one agent is allowed to pull the arm, according
to the arm’s preferences via a mechanism we detail shortly. Then, if player pi successfully pulls arm
mt(i) at time t, they are said to be matched to mt(i) at time t and they receive a stochastic reward
Xi,mt(t) sampled from a 1-sub-Gaussian distribution with mean µi(mt(i)).
Each arm aj has a fixed known ranking pij of the agents, where pij(i) is the rank of player pi.
In other words, pij is a permutation of [N ] and pij(i) < pij(i′) implies that arm aj prefers player
pi to player pi′ . If two or more agents attempt to pull the same arm aj , there is a conflict and
only the top-ranked agent successfully pulls the arm to receive a reward; the other agent(s) pi′ is
said to be unmatched and does not receive any reward, that is, Xi′,mt(t) = 0. As a shorthand, the
notation pi j pi′ means that arm aj prefers player pi over pi′ . When arm aj is clear from context,
we simply write pi  pi′ . Similarly, the notation aj i aj′ means that pi prefers arm aj over aj′ , i.e.
µi(j) > µi(j
′).
Given the full preference rankings of the arms and players, arm aj is called a valid match of player
pi if there exists a stable matching according to those rankings such that aj and pi are matched. We
say aj is the optimal match of agent pi if it is the most preferred valid match. Similarly, we say aj is
the pessimal match of agent pi if it is the least preferred valid match. Given complete preferences,
the Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm [13] finds a stable matching after repeated proposals from one side
of the market to the other. The matching returned by the GS algorithm is always optimal for each
member of the proposing side and pessimal for each member of the non-proposing side [16].
We denote bym andm the functions from N to K that define the optimal and pessimal matchings
of the players according to the true preferences of the players and arms. Then, it is natural to define
the agent-optimal stable regret of agent pi as
Ri(n) := nµi(m(i))−
n∑
t=1
EXi,mt(t), (1)
because when the arms’ mean rewards are known the GS algorithm outputs the optimal matching m,
and in online learning, regret is generally defined so that the reward of the agent is as good as the
reward of playing the best action in hindsight at every time step. However, as we show in the sequel,
there is a desirable class of centralized algorithms which cannot achieve sublinear agent-optimal
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stable regret. Therefore, we also consider the agent-pessimal stable regret defined by
Ri(n) := nµi(m(i))−
n∑
t=1
EXi,mt(t). (2)
Throughout we assume that the agents cannot observe each other’s rewards or confidence intervals
for the arms’ mean rewards. Now, we detail several interaction settings which are of interest:
Centralized: At each time step the agents are required to send a ranking of the arms to a matching
platform. Then, the platform decides the action vector mt. In this work we consider two platforms.
The first platform (shown in on the left of Table 1) outputs a random assignment for a number of
time steps and then computes the agent-optimal stable matching according to the agents’ preferences.
The second platform (shown on the right of Table 1) takes in the agent’s preferences at each time
step and outputs a stable matching between the agents and arms. Both platforms ensure that there
will be no conflicts between the agents. The first platform corresponds to an explore-then-commit
strategy. When the second platform is used the agents must rank arms in a way which enables
exploration and exploitation. We show that ranking according to upper confidence bounds yields
O(log(n)) agent-pessimal stable regret.
Decentralized with partial information: Agents observe each other’s actions and the outcomes
of the ensuing conflicts, but do not have a medium for coordination and communication.
Decentralized with no information: After selecting an arm, agents observe whether they lost
a conflict on that arm. When they successfully pull an arm they observe their own reward. However,
players do not observe any other information and do not have access to a medium for coordination
and communication. In Section 4, we analyze an explore-then-commit scheme in this setting.
3 Multi-agent bandits with a platform
3.1 Centralized Explore-then-Commit
In this section we give a guarantee for the explore-then-commit planner defined in Algorithm 1(left).
At each iteration, each agent pi updates their mean reward for arm j to be
µ̂i,j(t) =
1
Ti,j(t)
t∑
s=1
1{ms(i) = j}Xi,ms(s), (3)
where Ti,j(t) =
∑t
s=1 1{mt(i) = j} is the number of times agent pi successfully pulled arm aj . At
each time step, player pi ranks the arms in decreasing order according to µ̂i,j(t) and sends the
resulting ranking r̂i,t to the platform. As seen in Table 1, for the first hK time steps, the platform
assigns players to arms cyclically, ensuring that each agent samples every arm h times. We now
provide a regret analysis of centralized ETC. The proof is deferred to Section 3.1.1.
Theorem 1. Suppose all players rank arms according to the empirical mean rewards (3) and submit
their rankings to the explore-then-commit platform. Let ∆i,j = µi(m(i))− µi(j), ∆i,max = maxj ∆i,j,
and ∆ = mini∈[N ] minj : ∆i,j>0 ∆i,j > 0. Then, the expected agent-optimal regret of player pi is upper
bounded by
Ri(n) ≤ h
K∑
j=1
∆i,j + (n− hK)∆i,maxNK exp
(
−h∆
2
4
)
. (4)
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input: h, and the preference ranking pij of all
arms aj ∈ K, the horizon length n
1: for t = 1, . . . , T do
2: if t ≤ hK then
3: mt(i)← at+i−1 (mod K)+1, ∀i.
4: else if t = hK + 1 then
5: Receive rankings r̂i,t from all pi.
6: Compute agent-optimal stable
matching mt(i) according to r̂i,t and pij .
7: else
8: mt(i)← mhK+1(i), ∀i.
input: the preference ranking pij of all arms
aj ∈ K
1: for t = 1, . . . , T do
2: Receive rankings r̂i,t from all pi.
3: Compute agent-optimal stable matching
mt according to all r̂i,t and pij .
Table 1: (left) Explore-then-Commit Platform. (right) Gale-Shapley Platform.
In particular, if h = max
{
1, 4
∆2
log
(
1 + n∆
2N
4
)}
, we have
Ri(n) ≤ max
{
1,
4
∆2
log
(
1 +
n∆2N
4
)} K∑
j=1
∆i,j +
4K∆i,max
∆2
log
(
1 +
n∆2N
4
)
. (5)
This result shows that centralized ETC achieves O(log(n)) agent-optimal stable regret when the
number of exploration rounds is chosen apriopriately. As is the case for single agent ETC, centralized
ETC requires knowledge of both the horizon n and the minimum gap ∆ [see, e.g., 18, Chapter 6].
However, a glaring difference between the the settings is that in the latter the regret of each agent
scales with 1/∆2, where ∆ is the minimum reward gap between the optimal match and a suboptimal
arm across all agents. In other words, the regret of an agent might depend on the suboptimality
gap of other agents. Example 2 shows that this dependence is real in general and not an artifact
of our analysis. Moreover, while single agent ETC achieves O(√n) problem-independent regret,
Example 2 shows that centralized ETC does not have this desirable property. Finally,
∑K
j=1 ∆i,j
could be negative for some agents. Therefore, some agents can have negative agent-optimal regret,
an effect that never occurs in the single agent MAB problem.
Example 2 (The dependence on 1/∆2 cannot be improved in general). Let N = {p1, p2} and
K = {a1, a2} with true preferences:
p1 : a1  a2 a1 : p1  p2
p2 : a2  a1 a2 : p1  p2.
The agent-optimal stable matching is given by m(1) = 1 and m(2) = 2. Both a1 and a2 prefer p1
over p2. Therefore, at the end of the exploration stage p1 is matched to their top choice arm while
p2 is matched to the remaining arm. In order for p2 to be matched to their optimal arm, p1 must
correctly determine that they prefer a2 over a1. The number of exploration rounds would then have to
be Ω(1/∆21,2) where ∆1,2 = µ1(2)− µ1(2). Hence, when ∆1,2 ≤ 1/
√
n, the regret of p2 is Ω(n∆2,1).
Figure 1a depicts this effect empirically; we observe that a smaller gap ∆1,2 causes p1 to have larger
regret.
3.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First we present two instructive lemmas that are used in the proof of Theorem 1, Throughout the
remainder of this section, we say the ranking r̂i,t submitted by pi at time t is valid if whenever an
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arm aj is ranked higher than m(i), i.e. r̂i,j(t) < r̂i,m(i)(t), it follows that µi(j) > µi(m(i)).
Lemma 3. If all the agents submit valid rankings to the planner, then the GS-algorithm finds a
match m such that µi(m(i)) ≥ µi(m(i)) for all players pi.
Proof. First we show that true agent optimal matchingm is stable according to the rankings submitted
by the agents when all those rankings are valid. Let aj be an arm such that r̂i,j(t) < r̂i,m(i)(t) for
an agent pi. Since r̂i,t is valid, it means pi prefers aj over m(i) according to the true preferences
also. However, since m is stable according to the true preferences, arm aj must prefer player m−1(j)
over pi, where m−1(j) is aj ’s match according to m or the emptyset if aj does not have a match.
Therefore, according to the ranking r̂i,t, pi has no incentive to deviate to arm aj because that
arm would reject her. Now, since m is stable according to the rankings r̂i,t, we know that the
GS-algorithm will output a matching which is at least as good as m for all agents according to the
rankings r̂i,t. Since all the rankings are valid, it follows that the GS-algorithm will output a matching
m which is as least as good as m according to the true preferences also, i.e., µi(m(i)) > µi(m(i)).
Lemma 4. Consider the agent pi and let ∆i,j = µi(m(i)) − µi(j) and ∆i,min = minj : ∆i,j>0 ∆i,j.
Then, if pi follows the Explore-then-Commit platform (see Table 1(a)), we have
P(r̂i,hK is invalid ) ≤ Ke−
h∆
2
i,min
2 .
Proof. Throughout this proof we denote t = hK as a shorthand. In order for the ranking r̂i,t to not
be valid there must exist an arm aj such that µi(m(i)) > µi(j), but r̂i,j(t) < r̂i,m(i)(t). This can
happen only when µ̂i,j(t) ≥ µ̂i,m(i)(t). The probability of this event is equal to
P
(
µ̂i,j(t) ≥ µ̂i,m(i)(t)
)
= P
(
µ̂i,m(i)(t)− µi(m(i))− µ̂i,j(t) + µi(j) ≤ µi(j)− µi(m(i))
)
≤ P (µ̂i,m(i)(t)− µi(m(i))− µ̂i,j(t) + µi(j) ≤ ∆i,min) .
Since each agent pulls each arm exactly h times during the exploration stage and since the rewards
from each arm are 1-sub-Gassian, we know that µ̂i,j′(t)−µi(j′)−µ̂i,j(t)+µi(j) is
√
2/h-sub-Gaussian.
Therefore,
P
(
µ̂i,j(t) ≥ µ̂i,m(i)(t)
) ≤ e−h∆2i4 .
The conclusion follows by a union bound over all possible arms aj .
Proof of Theorem 1. During the exploration stage each player pi pulls each arm aj exactly h times.
Therefore, the expected agent-optimal stable regret of agent pi after the first hK time steps is exactly
equal to h
∑K
j=1 ∆i,j (note that ∆i,j might be negative for some values of j). The agent-optimal
stable regret pi from time hK + 1 to time n is at most (n− hK)∆i,max. However, from Lemma 3 we
know that pi can incurr positive regret only if there exists a player who submits an invalid ranking
at time hK + 1. Lemma 4, together with a union bound over all agents, ensures that the probability
there exists a player who submits an invalid ranking is at most N exp
(
−h∆24
)
. This completes the
proof.
3.2 Centralized UCB
In the previous section we saw that centralized ETC achieves O(log(n)) agent-optimal regret for all
agents. However, centralized ETC must know the horizon n and the minimum gap ∆ between an
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optimal arm and a suboptimal arm. While knowing the horizon n is feasible in certain scenarios,
knowing ∆ is not plausible. It is known that single agent ETC achieves O(n2/3) when the number of
exploration rounds is chosen deterministically without knowing ∆, and there are also known methods
for adaptively choosing the number of exploration rounds so that single agent ETC achieves O(log(n))
[18]. However, in our setting, the O(n2/3) guarantee does not hold because the suboptimality gaps
of one agent affect the regret of other agents, and the known adaptive stopping times cannot be
implemented because the platform does not observe the agents’ rewards. Therefore, it is necessary
to find methods which do not need to know ∆.
Another drawback of centralized ETC is that it requires agents to learn concurrently. It thus
does not take prior knowledge of preferences into account and forces that player to explore arms
which might be suboptimal for them. The Gale-Shapley Platform shown in Table 1(right) resolves
this problem, always outputting the agent-optimal matching given the rankings received from the
agents. We derive an upper bound on the regret in this setting when all agents use upper confidence
bounds to rank arms. In Section 3.3 we show this method is incentive compatible.
Before proceeding with the analysis we define more precisely the UCB method employed by each
agent and also introduce several technical concepts. At each time step the platform matches agent pi
with arm mt(i). Each player pi successfully pulls arm mt(i), receives reward Xi,mt(t), and updates
their empircal mean for mt(i) as in (3). They then compute the upper confidence bound
ui,j(t) =
{ ∞ if Ti,j(t) = 0,
µ̂i,j(t) +
√
3 log t
2Ti(t−1) otherwise.
(6)
Finally, each player pi orders the arms according to ui,j(t) and computes the ranking r̂i,t+1 so that a
higher upper confidence bound means a better rank, e.g. arg maxj ui,j(t) is ranked first in r̂i,t+1.
Let m be an injective function from the set of players N to the set of arms K; hence m is the
matching where m(i) is the match of agent i. Then, let Tm(t) be the number of times matching m
is played by time t. For a matching m to be played at time t it must be stable according to the
current preference rankings of the agents and the fixed rankings of the arms, i.e. according to r̂i,t for
all pi ∈ N and pij for all aj ∈ K. We call such matchings achievable. We say a matching is truly
stable if it is stable according to the true preferences induced by the mean rewards of the arms. For
agent pi and arm p` we consider the set Mi,` of non-truly stable, achievable matchings m such that
m(i) = `. Let ∆i,` = µi(m(i))− µi(`).
Then, since any truly-stable matching yields regret smaller or equal than zero for all agents, we
can upper bound the regret of agent i as follows:
Ri(n) ≤
∑
` : ∆i,`>0
∆i,`
 ∑
m∈Mi,`
ETm(n)
 . (7)
For any matching m that is non-truly stable there must exist an agent pj and an arm ak, different
from arm m(j), such that the pair (pj , ak) is a blocking pair according to the true preferences µ,
i.e. µj(k) > µj(m(j)) and arm ak is either unmatched or pik(j) < pik(m−1(k)). We say the triplet
(pj , ak, ak′) is blocking when pj is matched with ak′ and the pair (pj , ak) is blocking. Let Bj,k,k′ be
the set of all matches blocked by the triplet (pj , ak, ak′). Given a set S of matchings, we say a set Q
of triplets (pj , ak, ak′) is a cover of S if ⋃
(pj ,ak,ak′ )∈Q
Bj,k,k′ ⊇ S.
Let C(S) denote the set of covers of S. Also, let ∆j,k,k′ = µj(k)− µj(k′). Now we state our result.
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Theorem 5. When all agents rank arms according to the upper confidence bounds (6) and submit
their preferences to the Gale-Shapley Platform, the regret of agent pi up to time n satisfies
Ri(n) ≤
∑
` : ∆i,`>0
∆i,`
 min
Q∈C(Mi,`)
∑
(pj ,ak,ak′ )∈Q
(
5 +
6 log(n)
∆2j,k,k′
) .
Theorem 5 offers a problem-dependent O(log(n)) upper bound guarantee on the agent-pessimal
stable regret of each agent pi. Similarly to the case of centralized ETC, the regret of one agent
depends on the suboptimality gaps of other agents. However, we saw in Section 3.1 that centralized
ETC achieves O(log(n)) agent-optimal stable regret, a stronger notion of regret. Example 6 shows
that centralized UCB cannot yield sublinear agent-optimal stable regret in general.
Example 6 (Centralized UCB does not achieve sublinear agent-optimal stable regret). Let N =
{p1, p2, p3} and K = {a1, a2, a3}, with true preferences given by:
p1 : a1  a2  a3 a1 : p2  p3  p1
p2 : a2  a1  a3 a2 : p1  p2  p3
p3 : a3  a1  a2 a3 : p3  p1  p2.
The agent-optimal stable matching is (p1, a1), (p2, a2), (p3, a3). When p3 incorrectly ranks a1  a3
and the other two players submit their correct rankings, the Gale-Shapley Platform outputs the
matching (p1, a2), (p2, a1), (p3, a3). In this case p3 will never correct their mistake because they
never get matched with a1 again, and hence their upper confidence bound for a1 will never shrink.
Figure 1b illustrates this example; the optimal regret for p1 and p2 is seen to be linear in n.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let Lj,k,k′(n) be the number of times agent pj pulls arm ak′ when the triplet
(pj , ak, ak′) is blocking the matching selected by the platform. Then, by definition∑
m∈Bj,k,k′
Tm(n) = Lj,k,k′(n). (8)
By the definition of a blocking triplet we know that if pj pulls ak′ when (pj , ak, ak′) is blocking, they
must have a higher upper confidence bound for ak′ than for ak. In other words, we are trying to
upper bound the expected number of times the upper confidence bound on ak′ is higher than that of
the better arm ak when we have the guarantee that each time this event occurs ak′ is successfully
pulled. Therefore, standard analysis for the single agent UCB [e.g., 8, Chap. 2] shows that
ELj,k,k′(n) ≤ 5 + 6 log(n)
∆2j,k,k′
. (9)
The conclusion follows from equations (7) and (8).
To better understand the guarantee of Theorem 5 we consider two examples in which the markets
have a special structure which enables us to simplify the upper bound on the regret. Moreover, in
Corollary 9 we consider the a worst case upper bound over possible coverings of matchings.
Example 7 (Global preferences). Let N = {p1, · · · , pN} and K = {a1, · · · , aK}. We assume the
following preferences: pi : a1  · · ·  aK and aj : p1  · · ·  pN . In other words all agents have the
same ranking over arms, and all arms have the same ranking over agents. Hence, the unique stable
matching is (p1, a1), (p2, a2), . . . , (pN , aN ). Moreover, for any pi and a` we can cover the set of
8
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Figure 1: The empirical performance of centralized UCB in the settings described in Examples 2, 6, and 7.
See Appendix A for the experimental details.
matchings Mi,` with the triplets (pi, ak, a`) for all k with 1 ≤ k ≤ i. Then, Theorem 5 implies (10)
once we observe that ∆i,k,` ≥ ∆i,` for all k ≤ i.
Ri(n) ≤ 5i
K∑
`=i+1
∆i,` +
K∑
`=i+1
6i log(n)
∆i,`
. (10)
Figure 1c illustrates this example empirically, displaying the optimal (also pessimal) regret of 5 out
of 20 agents. The 1st-ranked agent has sublinear regret, consistent with (10), while the 20th-ranked
agent has negative regret and our upper bound is indeed 0.
Example 8 (Unique pairs). Let N = {p1, · · · , pN} and K = {a1, · · · , aN} and assume that agent
pi prefers arm ai the most and that arm ai prefers agent pi the most. Therefore, the unique stable
matching is (p1, a1), (p2, a2), . . . , (pN , aN ). Then, we can cover each set Mi,` with the triplet
(pi, ai, a`). Therefore, Theorem 5 implies (11); note that the right-hand side is identical to the
guarantee for single agent UCB:
Ri(n) ≤ 5
K∑
`6=i
∆i,` +
N∑
`6=i
6 log(n)
∆i,`
. (11)
Corollary 9. Let ∆ = mini minj,j′ |µi(j) − µi(j′)|. When all players follow the centralized UCB
method, the regret of pi can be upper bounded as follows
Ri(n) ≤ max
`
∆i,`
(
6NK2 + 12
NK log(n)
∆2
)
.
Proof We consider the covering (j, k, k′) composed of all possible triples with µj(k) > µj(k′). Then,
Theorem 5 implies the result because
∑
k′ : µj(k′)<µj(k)
1
∆2
j,k,k′
≤∑K`=1 1`2∆2 ≤ 2∆2 .
3.3 Honesty and Strategic Behavior
Classical results show that in the agent-proposing GS algorithm, no single agent can improve their
match by misrepresenting their preferences, assuming that the other agents and arms submit their
true preferences [24, 12]. The result generalizes to coalition of agents. Moreover, when there is a
unique stable matching, the Dubins-Freedman Theorem says that no arms or agents can benefit
from misrepresenting their preferences [12].
The ETC Platform does not allows agents to choose which arms to explore. In this case, the
classical results on honesty in agent-proposing GS apply; the agents are incentivized to submit the
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rankings according to their current mean estimates. When agents have some degree of freedom
to explore over multiple rounds, it is no longer clear if any agents, or arms, can benefit from
misrepresenting their preferences in some of the rounds. In general, one agent’s preferences can
influence not only the matches of other agents, but also their reward estimates. One might be able
to improve their regret by capitalizing on the ranking mistakes of other agents. The possibilities for
long-term strategic behavior are more diverse than in the single-round setting.
We now show that when all agents except one submit their UCB-based preferences to the GS
Platform, the remaining agent has an incentive to also submit preferences based on their UCBs, so
long as they do not have multiple stable arms.
First, we establish the following lemma, which is an upper bound on the expected number of
times the remaining agent can pull an arm that is better than their optimal match, regardless of
what preferences they might have submitted to the platform.
Lemma 10. Let T il (n) be the number of times an agent i pulls an arm l such that the mean reward
of l for i is greater than i’s optimal match. Then
E[T il (n)] ≤ min
Q∈C(Mi,`)
∑
(j,k,k′)∈Q
(
5 +
6 log(n)
∆2j,k,k′
)
(12)
Proof. If agent i is matched with arm l in any round, the matching m must be unstable according
true preferences. We claim that there must exist a blocking triplet (j, k, k′) where j 6= i.
Arguing by contradiction, we suppose otherwise, that all blocking triplets in m only involve
agent i. By Theorem 4.2 in Abeledo and Rothblum [2], we can go from the matching m to a µ-stable
matching, by iteratively satisfying block pairs in a ‘gender consistent’ order O. To satisfy a blocking
pair (k, j), we break their current matches, if any, and match (k, j) to get a new matching. Doing
so, agent i can never get a worse match than l or become unmatched as the algorithm proceeds, so
the matching remains unstable—a contradiction. Hence there must exist a j 6= i such that j is part
of a blocking triplet in m. In particular, agent j must be submitting its UCB preferences.
The result then follows from the identity
E[T il (n)] =
∑
m∈Mi,`
ETm(n),
and Equation 9
Lemma 10 directly implies the following lower bound on the remaining agent’s optimal regret.
Proposition 11. Suppose all agents other than pi submit preferences according to the UCBs (6) to
the GS Platform. Then the following upper bound on agent i’s optimal regret holds:
Ri(n) ≥
∑
` : ∆i,l<0
∆i,l
 min
Q∈C(Mi,`)
∑
(j,k,k′)∈Q
(
5 +
6 log(n)
∆2j,k,k′
) . (13)
Therefore, there is no sequence of preferences that an agent can submit to the GS Platform
that would give them negative optimal regret greater than O(log n) in magnitude. When there is a
unique stable matching, Proposition 11 shows that no agent can gain significantly in terms of stable
regret by submitting preferences other than their UCB rankings.
When there exist multiple stable matchings, however, Proposition 11 leaves open the question of
whether any agent can submit a sequence of preferences that achieves super-logarithmic negative
pessimal regret for themselves, when all other agents are playing their UCB preferences. In other
words, can an agent do significantly better than its pessimal stable arm, by possibly deviating from
their UCB rankings? This is an interesting direction for future work.
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4 Decentralized Explore-Then-Commit
In the decentralized setting of the matching bandits problem, we propose a simple algorithm based on
Explore-Then-Commit (ETC) that can achieve low agent-optimal regret, albeit at a suboptimal rate.
A key observation behind this algorithm is that the Gale-Shapley algorithm can be implemented
with simultaneous proposing [see e.g. 26, Theorem 1], hence a central platform is not necessary for
the agents to reach a stable matching. We analyze this simple algorithm in order to motivate the
search for more efficient algorithms in the decentralized setting.
Description of the algorithm There are three stages. Stage 1 has HK rounds. In stage 1
(“Exploration”), every K rounds, each agent independently samples a random permutation of arms
and attempts arms in that order. Agents update the respective sample means of the arms only if
the pull was successful. In stage 2 (“Simultaneous Proposing GS"), each round each agent attempts
the arm with the highest sample mean that they haven’t had a conflict on in Stage 2. Stage 2
continues for N rounds. In stage 3 (“Exploitation”), every agent keeps pulls the last arm they pulled
successfully in stage 2.
In the following result, proved in Appendix B, we analyze the regret of the decentralized ETC.
Proposition 12 (Regret bound for decentralized ETC). Consider Decentralized ETC with stage
1 lasting HK rounds. Let ∆i,j , ∆i,max and ∆ be defined as before in Theorem 1. Let ρN,K :=(
1− 1K
)N−1. The expected agent-optimal regret of player pi is upper bounded by
Ri(n) ≤ HKµi(m(i)) + (n−HK)∆i,maxNK
(
2 exp
(
−Hρ
2
N,K
2
)
+ exp
(
−HρN,K∆
2
8
))
. (14)
5 Related work
Since its introduction by Thompson [31] in 1933, the stochastic multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem
has inspired a rich body of work spanning different settings, algorithms, and guarantees [17, 8, 18].
There has been recent interest in the MAB literature in problems with multiple, interacting
players [10, 30]. In one popular formulation known as bandits with collision, multiple players choose
from the same set of arms, and if two or more players choose the same arm, no reward is received by
any player [e.g. 19, 3, 6, 23]. This differs from our formulation, where arms have preferences and the
most preferred player receives a reward, while the other player selecting the arm do not. For the
stochastic bandits with collision problem where agents have the same preferences for arms, works
differ by the extent to which agents are allowed to communicate and to see collisions—the most
challenging setting is where there is no communication and no collision information [20]. Bubeck
et al. [9] delineated the optimal rates for the non-stochastic version of the problem.
A variant of this problem is where agents have different preferences over arms. For this problem,
Bistritz and Leshem [7]’s algorithm approximately finds the maximum matching of players to arms
with O(log(n)2+κ) regret. However, stable matching does not reduce to maximum matching in
general, so such guarantees do not apply to matching with two-sided preferences.
The two-sided matching problem has also been studied in sequential settings. Das and Kamenica
[11] proposed an empirical study of a two-sided matching problem where both sides of the market
have uncertain preferences Johari et al. [15] studied a sequential matching problem in which the
market participants are modeled with arrival processes.
Ashlagi et al. [5] considered the communication and preference learning cost of stable matching.
Their model formulates preference learning as querying a noiseless choice function, rather than
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obtaining noisy observations of one’s underlying utility. Different players can query their choice
functions independently; hence congestion in the preference learning stage is not captured by this
model. In many markets, obtaining information about the other side of the market itself can lead to
congestion and thus the need for strategic decision. For example, Roth and Sotomayor [28, chap.
10], note that graduating medical students go to interviews to ascertain their own preferences for
hospitals, but the interviews that a student can schedule are limited. Our model begins to capture
such tradeoffs by introducing statistical uncertainty in the preferences of one side of the market and
providing a natural mode of interaction between the learning agents.
6 Discussion
We have proposed a new model for dynamic matching in markets under uncertain preferences. The
model blends learning and competition, and captures two desirable notions: stability and sample
efficiency. We presented two natural algorithms which combine classical ideas from multi-armed
bandits and stable matching. Our focus in the current paper was the centralized UCB method,
which we proved enjoys small regret for each player and ensures that the market converges quickly
to a stable configuration.
There are many additional questions that can be studied in this model, including problems with
incomplete information, decentralized matching protocols and shared reward structures. We have
already seen that the uncertainty of one agent can depress the long-term utility of other agents,
and we expect to uncover other interactions between learning and strategic decision making in this
model.
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A Experimental Details
Figure 1a. This figure represents an empirical evaluation of Example 2. In this setting, there are
two agents and two arms. Player p2 receives Gaussian rewards from the arms a1, a2 with means 0
and 1 respectively and variance 1. Player p1 receives Gaussians rewards ∆ and 0 from the arms a1
and a2. Both arms prefer p1 over p2. Figure 1a shows the regret of each agent as a function of ∆
when we run centralized UCB with horizon 400 and average over 100 trials.
Figure 1b. This figure represents an empirical evaluation of Example 2. The rewards of the arms
for each agent are Gaussian with variance 1. The have mean rewards of the arms are set so that the
preference structure shown in Example 2 is satisfied. For agents p1 and p2, the gap in mean rewards
between consecutive arms is 1. For agent p3 the gap in mean reward between arms a1 and a3 is 0.05.
Figure 1b shows the performance of centralized UCB, averaged over 100 trials, as a function of the
horizon.
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Figure 7. This figure represents an empirical evaluation of Example 7 when there are 20 agents
and 20 arms. The rewards of the arms are Guassian with variance 1. The mean reward gap between
consecutive arms is 0.1. Figure 1b shows the performance of centralized UCB, averaged over 50
trials, as a function of the horizon.
B Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Suppose stage 1 lasts HK rounds. Fix the agent. For any particular attempt on arm i, let Yi
denote the event of a successful pull. The probability of a successful pull is bounded from below by
the probability of a successful pull for an agent that is the least preferred by the arm attempted.
pi := P{Yi = 1} ≥
(
1− 1
K
)N−1
=: ρN,K
Let Ti be the number of times arm i was pulled in stage 1. By the independence of the random
permutations sampled, we have that Ti ∼ Binomial(H, pi). We can use a standard tail bound:
P{Ti ≤ t} ≤ exp
(
−2(Hpi − t)
2
H
)
Stage 2 gives rise to a matching that is stable according to the order of the average rewards
(Rˆij(T )), after N rounds. This is essentially the Gale-Shapley algorithm but with simultaneous
proposals.
Now we bound the probability that this matching is agent optimal according to the true
preferences. If any agent j ranks arm k and arm k′ wrongly, we must have Rˆkj (H) > Rˆ
k′
j (H) but
µj(k
′) > µj(k). Therefore, we may bound the probability of a blocking pair using the sub-Gaussianity
of Rˆkj (H)− Rˆk
′
j (H). Let Ak,k′ denote the event {(Rˆk
′
j − Rˆkj )− (µj(k′)−µj(k)) ≤ −(µj(k′)−µj(k))}.
P(Ak,k′) =
∑
j,j′<H
P(Ak,k′ ∩ Tk = j ∩ Tk′ = j′)
=
∑
j∧j′<h
P(Ak,k′ ∩ Tk = j ∩ Tk′ = j′) +
∑
j∧j′≥h
P(Ak,k′ ∩ Tk = j ∩ Tk′ = j′)
≤ P(Tk < h) + P(Tk′ < h) +
∑
j∧j′≥h
P(Ak,k′ | Tk = j, Tk′ = j′) · P(Tk = j, Tk′ = j′)
≤ P(Tk < h) + P(Tk′ < h) +
∑
j∧j′≥h
exp
(
−(j ∧ j
′)(∆k,k′)2
4
)
P(Tk = j, Tk′ = j′)
≤ P(Tk < h) + P(Tk′ < h) + exp
(
−h(∆k,k′)
2
4
)
.
Choosing h = 12Hpi gives
P(Ak,k′) ≤ 2 exp
(
−Hp
2
i
2
)
+ exp
(
−Hpi(∆k,k′)
2
8
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−Hρ
2
N,K
2
)
+ exp
(
−HρN,K∆
2
8
)
By Lemma 3, we only have to consider k′ = m(i) and k such that ∆i,k > 0, so there are at most
K such pairs, for each agent.
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